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CLOUDY WEATHER, WITH OCCASIONAL SUNSHINE:
CONSUMER LOANS, THE LEGISLATURE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN
Shigenori Matsui†
Abstract: The Supreme Court of Japan, despite its well-known passive and
conservative stance towards constitutional adjudication, occasionally shows quite a
creative and liberal attitude. Recently, the Supreme Court of Japan has shown this
attitude in its development of pro-consumer jurisprudence involving consumer loan cases.
This development is still more noteworthy because the Supreme Court of Japan ignored
the legislature’s intent to overturn its previous judgments and practically wiped out a
statutory provision enacted by the legislature. As a result of this development, millions
of consumers could demand refunds from consumer loan companies, and consumer loan
companies went into serious financial troubles, triggering massive reorganization of the
industry. This article outlines this development in the consumer loan cases, examines
how the Supreme Court of Japan accomplished this result, and explores the reason why
the Supreme Court of Japan decided to take such a bold action.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Judges in the civil law tradition are supposed to interpret the
provisions of a statute according to the people’s will as embodied in the
textual provisions. They are not making law, but simply following the
command stipulated in the textual provisions. 1 Civil law judges become
judges right after their professional training and remain on the bench until
the mandatory retirement age. They are career judges and are in reality
judicial bureaucrats working inside the judiciary.2 Japanese judges, trained
and equipped with judicial power in the longtime civil law tradition that
dates back to 19th century, generally demonstrate a positivistic and
bureaucratic attitude.
However, everyone knows that judges, even in the civil law tradition,
often make law. 3 Sometimes, they create judicial doctrines that are not
†

Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.
For a general description of the role of the judges in the civil law tradition, see MARY A NN
GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, & COLIN B. P ICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 248-51 (3d ed.
2007).
2
See Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN
THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263, 264 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994) (observing that judges are “virtually
life-time employees of a national government bureaucracy called the judiciary.”).
3
See M AURO CAPPELLETTI, THE J UDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 53 (1989)
(“[T]he problem of judicial creativity has emerged even in a growing number of civil law countries in
contours no less dramatic than in the common law jurisdictions. Far from not being susceptible to
comparative analysis, the problem is essentially the same in both legal families.”).
1
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anticipated by the legislature. And, sometimes, they create judicial doctrines
that are contrary to legislative intent.
The Supreme Court of Japan, generally well-known for its passive and
conservative attitude toward constitutional adjudication,4 occasionally shows
judicial creativity. Such judicial creativity is most apparent in its
establishment of anti-dismissal jurisprudence against employers. The Labor
Standard Act mandates that employers provide thirty-day advance notice
before dismissing employees or pay an average thirty-day salary before
firing their employees, if such advance notice is not given.5 Thus, one may
be tempted to believe that private companies could fire their employees if
they paid a thirty-day average salary. But, in reality, the Supreme Court of
Japan fashioned a jurisprudence that practically prohibits private companies
from firing their employees without compelling reason, invoking the abuse
of rights doctrine.6 Even when a company is in economic crisis, the courts
will not allow companies to fire their employees unless the dismissal is
unavoidable and there is no other alternative to save the company. As a
result, it has become quite difficult to dismiss employees in Japan. The Diet,
or national legislature, codified this jurisprudence into the Labor Contract
Act.7 This example clearly shows that judges in Japan can and do create
judicial doctrine without a basis in statutory provisions. General clauses of
the Civil Code, such as a ban on abuse of rights, 8 provide judges a
convenient tool to create judicial doctrine. Moreover, this jurisprudence is
politically quite liberal in the sense that it was meant to protect workers
against the companies that employ them.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Japan showed a similar kind of
judicial creativity in establishing a pro-consumer jurisprudence against
consumer loan companies. This jurisprudence is remarkable because it was
accomplished by ignoring the legislature’s contrary intent. Although the
Diet enacted a statutory provision in order to overturn a previous proconsumer judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan ignored this legislative
intent and practically wiped out the new provision. The judgments of the
4
SHIGENORI M ATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 145-50 (2011);
Shigenori Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375
(2011).
5
Roudō kijunhō [Labor Standard Act], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 20.
6
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 1977, 268 ROUDŌ HANREI 17 (2nd petty bench) (Kōchi
Broadcasting Case). See generally Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law:
Activism, in the Service of –Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996).
7
Roudō Keiyakuhō [Labor Contract Act], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 16.
8
MINPŌ [CIV.C.], art. 1, para. 1 (private rights must conform to the public welfare); id. para. 2 (the
exercise of rights and performance of duties must be done in good faith); id. at para. 3 (no abuse of rights is
permitted).
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Supreme Court of Japan had a tremendous impact on the consumer loan
industry and consumer loan regulation. As a result of this pro-consumer
jurisprudence, millions of consumers could now demand refunds from
consumer loan companies. Consumer loan companies went into serious
financial troubles, triggering massive reorganization of the industry.
Moreover, these developments forced the Diet to amend the regulatory
statute in order to introduce more demanding regulation against consumer
loan companies. This pro-consumer jurisprudence is also highly liberal in
that these judgments were meant to protect consumers against consumer
loan companies.
This article shows how the Supreme Court of Japan accomplished this
result by engaging in creative judicial law-making. Part II provides a
background for the development of the pro-consumer jurisprudence by the
Supreme Court of Japan. It outlines the statutory framework for limiting
interest rates on consumer loans, the historical development of the consumer
loan industry, and the response of the Supreme Court of Japan to the
limitations on interest rates. We will see that despite a legislative
compromise, which allowed consumer loan companies to collect higher
interest rates while limiting the maximum interest rate, the Supreme Court of
Japan came to ignore this compromise and wiped out the statutory provision
in order to benefit consumers. Then, this article will examine the legislative
response to the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan and see how the
legislature introduced new regulatory framework to control consumer loan
companies. By introducing this comprehensive regulation, the legislature
overturned the judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan and allowed the
collection of higher interest by the consumer loan companies. The Supreme
Court of Japan initially showed its willingness to accept this legislative
judgment. But soon the Supreme Court of Japan came to ignore it and made
this provision a dead letter.
Part III will examine how the Supreme Court of Japan could
practically wipe out this new statutory provision, paying close attention to
what kind of interpretive techniques were used by the Supreme Court of
Japan to reach this result. Then Part IV examines the impact of those
judgments and the 2006 amendments brought by the Diet in response to
them. Specifically, it inquires whether these judgments were a blessing for
consumers and whether they managed to solve the root problem of money
borrowing in Japan. Finally, Part V summaries the interpretive methodology
used by the Supreme Court of Japan to illustrate how creative the court was
and explores why it decided to take such a bold action. Although the there is
wide support for the development of this pro-consumer jurisprudence,
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despite the contrary legislative intent, how such a development could be
justified in a democratic country remains a question.
II.

CONSUMER LOANS AND CONSUMERS

In order to understand the context for the development of the proconsumer jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Japan, we need to examine
the background of consumer loan regulation in Japan. Formerly, although
the maximum interest rate that consumer loan companies could charge was
restricted by statute, consumer loan companies were allowed to collect
higher interest rates–only the highest rates were criminally prohibited. The
consumer loan industry grew into a major industry, taking advantage of this
regulatory gap. The Supreme Court of Japan initially showed its willingness
to accept this legislative compromise. However, it came to ignore this
compromise and wipe out the statutory provision for the benefit of
consumers. In response to this judicial development, the legislature
introduced a new regulatory framework to control consumer loan companies.
The legislature once again decided to allow consumer loan companies to
receive a higher interest rate. The legislature apparently intended to
overturn the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan. The Supreme Court
of Japan then showed its willingness to accept this legislative judgment.
A.

“Gray Zone” Interest Rate

Like many Americans, Japanese people borrow money from banks,
credit unions, and other financial institutions. Especially when they buy
houses, they have to rely upon financial institutions for a loan. The loan is
granted only after very careful review of the borrower’s financial situation.
These financial institutions generally require mortgages on property as
collateral, and require borrowers to sign assurance contracts with the
assurance companies and to sign life insurance contracts to secure payment.
The amount of money that consumers can borrow depends upon the
financial capacity of the borrower and the value of their property as
collateral.
The maximum interest rate that financial institutions can charge is
stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act of 1954.9 This act sets the
maximum interest rate for a loan according to the amount of principal in
Article 1, paragraph 1.10 If the principal amounts to less than 100,000 yen
9
10

Risokuseigenhō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 1.
Id. art. 1, para. 1.

JUNE 2013

CONSUMER LOANS IN JAPAN

559

(1,000 USD with the exchange rate of 1 USD to 100 yen), the maximum
interest rate is 20% per year. If principal amounts to more than 100,000 yen
and less than one million yen (10,000 USD), the maximum interest rate is
18% per year. If the principal amounts to more than one million yen, the
maximum interest rate is 15% per year. Any contract with an interest rate
higher than the rate stipulated in this act is null and void. 11 Financial
institutions must obey this limitation. However, this is a civil law statute
and carries no criminal punishment against violation.
On the other hand, many people need financial assistance for
everyday life or for business. For these people, loans from financial
institutions are unavailable or unattractive. Most of them do not have any
property to mortgage. Moreover, they need money more quickly. They
cannot endure the financial institutions’ long and complicated review of
their financial situations. Furthermore, banks are not enthusiastic about
consumer retail loans. Thus, the average individual must turn to consumer
loan companies that are willing to provide loans without an elaborate review
process and without the requirement to submit properties for mortgage.
Many of these consumer loan companies were called “sala-kin” (finance for
salaried workers) because most of their customers were salaried workers.
All a customer had to do was provide a piece of identification, and the
consumer loan company would be happy to lend money with minimal
review (generally they would check whether the applicants were actually
working at the company as they claimed). The amount of money they could
receive was usually small, often less than 500,000 yen (5,000 USD) or one
million yen. Customers were usually allowed to pay back the loan by
monthly installment.
Because of the minimal review process, many consumers ended up
failing to pay back their borrowed money. Moreover, the loans were largely
unsecured loans. To make a profit, these consumer loan companies charged
much higher interest rates, often higher than the rate stipulated in the Interest
Rate Limitation Act. Even though a contract is null and void to the extent it
charges higher interest rate, there is a provision in the Interest Rate
Limitation Act that prevents consumers from requesting a refund if they paid
the higher interest “voluntarily.”12 The consumer loan companies were thus
allowed to charge a higher interest rate and collect payment.
The only limitation was the maximum interest rate stipulated in the
Capital Subscription Act. This act established the maximum interest rate,
11
12

Id.
Id. art. 1, para. 2. This provision was later deleted in 2006. See infra note 135.
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with a criminal punishment against violation.13 The maximum interest rate
allowed was 109.5% in 1954, and it was cut down to 73% in 1983, 54.75%
in 1986, 40% in 1991, and then 29.2% from 2000. 14 If consumer loan
companies charged an interest rate higher than this maximum interest rate,
then the police could search their offices, arrest the managers, and prosecute
them for a criminal law violation. As a result, on the surface of the statutes,
consumer loan companies could charge an interest rate higher than the rate
stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act so long as the interest rate was
lower than the maximum interest rate stipulated in the Capital Subscription
Act. The legislature apparently made a compromise between business and
consumer interests. The gap in interest rate regulation between the two acts
is generally called the “gray-zone” interest rate.15
B.

Consumer Loans and Japanese Borrowers

The modern consumer loan industry in Japan was a rather dubious one
in the beginning.16 It started in the 1950s, and most of the loan companies
were small companies, operating in small offices in city-center, high-rise
buildings. Unlike financial institutions, which were subject to tight
regulation by the Ministry of Finance and now by the Financial Services
Agency, these consumer loan companies were once only subject to
notification requirements and to regulation under the Act Concerning the
Policing of the Loan Company of 1949.17 But in 1954, as part of an attempt
at liberalization, this statute was abolished and consumer loan companies
were left to be generally regulated by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (“MITI”) (the predecessor of the current Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry). As a result, the industry was not well regulated and
many people suspected that these loan companies had some ties with illegal
gang groups and were engaging in some suspicious activities. As we will
see, in 1983, the Consumer Loan Company Act 18 was enacted and the
13
Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning
Regulation of Receipt of Subscription of Capital, Deposit, and Interest Rate], Law No. 195 of 1954, art. 5.
14
This provision was later amended in 2006 and the maximum interest rate was cut down to 20% per
year. See infra note 136. For a history of change in the maximum interest rate regulation after the WWII,
see Andrew M. Pardieck, Japan and the Moneylender–Activist Courts and Substantive Justice, 17 PACIFIC
RIM L. & POL ’Y J. 529, 540-42 (2008).
15
Id. at 543.
16
For a history of moneylenders and the usury regulation before WWII, see Pardieck, supra note 14,
at 533-40.
17
Kashikingyōtō no torishimarini kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Policing of the Loan Company],
Law No. 170 of 1949 (abolished in 1954).
18
Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983. Its original title was Kashikingyōno
kiseitō nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Regulation of Loan Company] but its title was amended to the
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government introduced much stricter regulation by the Ministry of Finance
(later regulated by the Financial Services Agency), but there still remained a
striking difference between the regulation of consumer loan companies and
the regulation of financial institutions.
Gradually, large corporations came to dominate the market and
foreign financial institutions also entered the market.
These large
corporations adopted a media strategy to improve the industry’s image.
They hired many female customer service representatives, ran many
television commercials, and attempted to create an image that the consumer
loan companies are well-regulated, customer-friendly companies. Their
strategy paid off and consumers gradually came to accept the consumer loan
companies. Especially after the burst of the economic bubble in the early
1990s, an increasing number of consumers turned to consumer loan
companies. Many consumers simply had to borrow money to survive
because of the long-lasting economic stagflation.19
In the 2000s, the consumer loan industry became a booming business.
Takefuji, Promise, Aiful, Acom, Lake, and others companies ran television
commercials soliciting customers and competing to provide consumer
friendly service. They advertised how easy it was to borrow money and
assured customers that their privacy would be carefully protected. They
opened offices in the most popular spots in the city and their offices were
nicely decorated. They made it possible for customers to borrow money
through ATM machines with minimum review. They even built shields to
protect the privacy of customers entering the ATM office to ease consumer
fears that they might be noticed by neighbors. Consumer loans became quite
popular. It was estimated that fourteen million customers, one in nine of the
total population, were borrowing money from these consumer loan
companies.20 It is no wonder that the consumer loan industry registered a
huge profit.
Because the review process for borrowers was minimal, many
consumers used to borrow money from multiple consumer loan companies,
leading to huge amounts of debt with no prospect of paying the loans back.
Some consumers had to borrow money in order to pay the higher interest of
current one from 2007. For a closer examination of the regulation introduced, see infra notes 36-42;
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 552-54.
19
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 558; MARK D. WEST, LAW IN EVERYDAY JAPAN: SEX, SUMO,
SUICIDE, AND STATUTES 225 (2005) (noting the significant increase of the consumer debt in the 1990s).
20
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, TAJŪSAIMUSHATAISAKUHONBU YŪSHIKISHAKAIGI [CONFERENCE
OF EXPERTS OF THE HEADQUARTER FOR COPING WITH HEAVILY-INDEBTED BORROWERS],
TAJŪSAIMUSHAMONDAINO KAIKETSU NIMUKETA HOUSAKU NITSUITE [ON MEASURES TO COPE WITH THE
ISSUES CONCERNING HEAVILY-INDEBTED BORROWERS] (Apr. 9, 2007).
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the existing loans, increasing the total amount of their loan. The number of
such deeply indebted consumers surpassed two million by 2006.21 Some
companies began to use violent or threatening collection methods, forcing
debtors to run away or commit suicide. The use of such violent and
intimidating collection methods became widely known in 1999, when one
employee of the loan company Nichiei demanded that the defaulting
borrower sell his kidney or eyeball to pay off the loan.22 Regulation of the
loan companies was tightened. 23 Nevertheless, consumer loan companies
were willing to lend money even with additional risks of default in order to
increase the number of loans. As a result, the consumer loan issue became a
very serious social issue.24
C.

The Response of the Supreme Court of Japan

The Supreme Court of Japan initially showed its willingness to accept
the compromise reached in the Interest Rate Limitation Act. In a 1955
ruling, the Supreme Court of Japan rejected the claim for a refund when the
customer paid an interest rate higher than the rate prescribed by the Interest
Rate Limitation Act without objecting.25 In another case, a customer argued
that a loan contract with an interest rate higher than the maximum prescribed
in the Interest Rate Limitation Act was against “public order and good moral”
as stipulated in Article 90 of the Civil Code,26 and that the contract should be
viewed as null and void as a whole. But the Supreme Court of Japan was
not persuaded. It held that, in the absence of special circumstances, a
contract with a higher interest rate could not be said to violate pubic order or

21

In 2006, it was reported that some 2.3 million borrowers were heavily in debt, in debt to five or
more lenders, and 2.7 million were behind on payments and were in default. Id.; Pardieck, supra note 14,
at 530.
22
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 560-61.
23
In response, the maximum interest rate in the Capital Subscription Act was reduced from 40% to
29.2%. See supra note 14. The system of sharing credit information was also established by major loan
companies, allowing the consumer loan companies to find out how much money the borrower was
borrowing from other loan companies in total.
CREDIT INFORMATION CENTER, available at
http://www.cic.co.jp/. But it was only major loan companies that used this credit information and the use
was not mandatory.
24
Souichirou Kozuka & Luke R. Nottage, Re-Regulating Unsecured Consumer Credit in Japan:
Over-Indebted Borrowers, the Supreme Court, and New Legislation, (Sydney Law School Research Paper
No. 07/62, Sept. 2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019392.
25
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 22, 1955, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO M INJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
209 (3rd petty bench).
26
MINPŌ [CIV. C.], art. 90.
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good moral in and of itself.27 This stance was affirmed again in 1962. The
Supreme Court denied a borrower’s claim for a refund when the borrower
voluntarily paid back a higher interest rate under Article 1, paragraph 2 of
the Interest Rate Limitation Act, and also denied the application of the
excessive payment to the satisfaction of the principal, holding that such
application would undermine Article 1, paragraph 2.28
However, gradually, the Supreme Court of Japan came to protect
borrowers against consumer loan companies. The Supreme Court of Japan
held in 1964 that, although consumers could not request a refund when they
paid the higher interest rate voluntarily, their payments had to be viewed as
satisfying the principal, thus reducing the amount of principal.29 Even when
a customer paid money designated as a payment of interest, the Supreme
Court of Japan said, an excessive interest rate beyond the rate stipulated in
Article 1 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act was void and such a designation
was meaningless and should be treated as if there were no designation at
all. 30 This judgment was hailed as “the beginning of a newly assertive
Supreme Court” for the protection of consumers. 31 In 1968, when a
consumer made a payment after he had already paid back the principal,
believing that he still owed the money, the Supreme Court of Japan held that
a consumer could request a refund as a remedy for unjust enrichment. 32
Article 1, paragraph 2 is a provision, according to the Supreme Court of
Japan, that assumes the remaining balance to be paid, and therefore this
provision does not preclude a refund claim when the consumers paid off all
the principal. 33 In other words, when the debtor pays an interest rate in
excess of the statutory limit and when the debtor’s payments satisfy the
principal, then the debtor can demand a refund for amounts paid beyond the
principal despite Article 1, paragraph 2. These judgments practically made
Article 1, paragraph 2 a dead letter. These were clear examples of “judicial
legislation.”34
27
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 18, 1953, 7 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1470 (2nd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 5, 1954, 8 S AIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 2014 (2nd petty bench).
28
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 1962, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO M INJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1340 (grand bench).
29
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1868 (grand bench). The Supreme Court of Japan thus overruled its 1962 judgment. Id.
30
Id.
31
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 545.
32
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 13, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
2526 (grand bench). See MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 703.
33
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 13, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
2526 (grand bench).
34
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 547.
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In these judgments, the Supreme Court of Japan gave priority to the
overarching legislative intent of consumer protection manifested in the
Interest Rate Limitation Act. Interpreting the payment of interest in excess
of the statutory limitation as satisfying the principal and thus reducing the
amount of principal to be paid, said the Supreme Court of Japan, comports
with the “primary legislative intent of the law to protect the borrower who
was in economically disadvantaged position.” 35 The Supreme Court of
Japan thereby ignored the compromise that the legislature made. The
legislature, while limiting the interest rate in the Interest Rate Limitation Act,
left the higher interest rate un-prohibited in the Capital Subscription Act
(subject to limitations stipulated in that Capital Subscription Act) and
allowed lenders to receive the payment of higher interest rates so long as the
payment was voluntary under Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Interest Rate
Limitation Act. These judgments, however, practically deprived Article 1,
paragraph 2 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act of any meaning.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Japan did not care about the parties’
contractual intent. Usually, consumers pay back loans through monthly
installments and the amount of payment is clearly divided into payment
towards the principal and payment towards the interest. Consumers thus
know that they are paying towards a higher interest rate. Nevertheless, even
when the debtor payment is designated as a payment of interest, that intent is
disregarded by the Supreme Court of Japan. The payment of interest in
excess of the statutory limit is now automatically viewed as satisfying the
principal and any overpayment must be refunded when the payment has
already satisfied the principal.
D.

Loan Company Act and Article 43

In 1983, however, the Loan Company Act36 was enacted to regulate
consumer loan companies. This Act was meant to secure the proper
operation of consumer loan businesses, thereby protecting the interests of the
borrower and contributing to the proper administration of national life. 37
This act introduced a registration requirement for consumer loan companies
with the prime minister or prefectural governor38 and imposed an elaborate
35
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1868 (grand bench).
36
Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983.
37
Id. art. 1.
38
Id. art. 3. Loan companies to be registered under this act include consumer loan companies
(Shōhisha kin-yū or shōhisha loan) as well as business loan companies (Shōkō loan) and credit companies
that lend money by using credit cards (if the customer buys some goods using credit card, this is shopping
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governmental regulatory scheme. For example, under Article 17 of this act,
a loan company was obliged to provide the customer with a written
document stating the details of the contract–the name and address of the loan
company, the date of the contract, the amount of the loan, the interest rate,
the method of payment, the term and frequency of the payment, the penalty
for default, and other information to be specified by the cabinet order–at the
time of the conclusion of the contract.39 Under Article 18, the loan company
was obliged to provide written receipt stating the transaction, including: the
name and address of the loan company, the date of the contract, the amount
of the loan, the amount of receipt, how the received payment is apportioned
to the principal and interest, the date of receipt, and other information to be
specified by the cabinet order.40 The payment collection method was also
regulated. Harassment or invasion of privacy was prohibited in the
collection of a loan.41 All of these regulations were enforced by the Ministry
of Finance (now enforced by the Financial Services Agency).
In exchange for government regulation, Article 43 of this act deemed
the payment of an interest rate higher than the rate stipulated in the Interest
Rate Limitation Act as valid payment of interest under certain
circumstances: the consumers must have paid the money voluntarily, the
consumer loan company must have provided the written document showing
the necessary information at the time of conclusion of consumer loan
contract as stipulated in Article 17, and the consumer loan company must
have provided a written receipt stipulated in Article 18 immediately when it
receives a payment from the consumer. 42 The registered consumer loan
companies were thus expressly granted the right to receive the higher
interest rate under this provision subject to limitation of the Capital
Subscription Act. Apparently, the legislative intent behind this provision
was to overrule the pro-consumer judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan.
Article 43 was not popular among lawyers. Many criticized it for
allowing consumer loan companies to take advantage of the desperate
economic situation of borrowers and charge higher interest rates–rates made
illegal under the Interest Rate Limitation Act. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
however, the Supreme Court of Japan seemed to accept the legislative
judgment. It allowed loan companies to receive payments of excessive
credit and is not subjected to the Loan Company Act). Banks, credit unions and similar financial
institutions are not subjected to this Act.
39
Id. art. 17.
40
Id. art. 18.
41
Id. art. 21.
42
Id. art. 43. This provision was deleted and replaced with another provision in 2006. See infra
note 134.
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interest rates, even when the consumer did not know that he or she was
paying an excessively high interest rate.43 It was not legally required that a
debtor understand that he or she was paying an interest rate in excess of the
statutory limit; the contract was not void to the extent that the higher interest
rate was charged in order for the debtor to pay back it back “voluntarily.”44
If the debtor made a payment with the understanding that it would be applied
to interest, the Supreme Court of Japan held, that was sufficient to make the
payment “voluntary,” and to enable the consumer loan company to enjoy the
benefit of Article 43.45
III.

CONSUMER LOANS, THE LEGISLATURE, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
JAPAN

We saw that there used to exist a gap between the maximum interest
rate allowed by the Interest Rate Limitation Act and the maximum interest
rate prohibited by the Capital Subscription Act with criminal punishment.
The consumer loan companies were permitted under Article 1, paragraph 2
of the Interest Rate Limitation Act to collect interest rates higher than the
maximum interest rates allowed by the Interest Rate Limitation Act so long
as the interest rate was lower than the maximum interest rate prohibited by
the Capital Subscription Act. We also saw that the Supreme Court of Japan,
initially showing willingness to accept this compromise, came to practically
wipe out Article 1, paragraph 2 and deny consumer loan companies the
ability to collect higher interest rates. However, the legislature responded to
this development by introducing comprehensive regulation of consumer loan
companies in the Loan Company Act and inserting the statutory provision,
Article 43, to overturn the judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan–
consumer loan companies were again allowed to collect higher interest rates.
We also saw that at first the Supreme Court of Japan was willing to show
deference to the new enactment.
Nevertheless, it did not take long for the Supreme Court of Japan to
reverse this attitude. Once again, the Supreme Court of Japan came to adopt
a highly pro-consumer stance. As we will examine more closely in this Part,
the Supreme Court of Japan came to:
1. construe conditions for enjoying the benefit of Article 43 quite
strictly;
43

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 1990, 44 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
332 (2nd petty bench).
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2. view all additional payment other than payment to the principal as
payment of interest;
3. deny the applicability of Article 43 when the loan company
subtracted the higher interest at the time of loan;
4. construe the voluntariness requirement rigidly;
5. view payment of excessive interest as satisfying other loans;
6. allow customers to demand refunds from the loan companies when
they paid back the principal;
7. impose the obligation to pay refunds with statutory interest rate;
8. extend the period before the statute of limitations precludes a
refund claim; and
9. impose on the loan companies the duty to disclose the transaction
history to customers.
The Supreme Court of Japan thus practically denied consumer loan
companies the benefit of receiving payment of higher interest rates admitted
under Article 43 and allowed millions of customers to demand refunds from
consumer loan companies after they paid off all their loans. In other words,
it essentially wiped out Article 43.
A.

Construing the Requirements for Enjoying Article 43 Strictly

First, the Supreme Court of Japan interpreted the conditions attached
to receiving payment from consumers literally and made it quite difficult for
consumer loan companies to enjoy the benefits of Article 43. In 1999, the
Supreme Court of Japan held that the written receipt requirement in Article
18 must be rigidly enforced. In that case, the customer wired funds for
scheduled payments directly to the bank account of the loan company and
later claimed that the payment of a higher interest rate should be construed
to satisfy the principal despite Article 43. The consumer loan company
argued that when the customer wired funds directly into their bank account,
the requirement of written receipt should not apply and that the loan
company should be allowed to enjoy the benefits of Article 43. The
Supreme Court of Japan was not persuaded by the arguments of the
consumer loan company. 46 Emphasizing that the written receipt must be
issued immediately upon receiving each payment as stipulated in Article 18,
the Supreme Court of Japan held that even when the customers wired their
payment directly into the bank account of the consumer loan company, the
46
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 21, 1999, 53 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 98
(1st petty bench).
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consumer loan company had to follow all of the requirements strictly in
order to enjoy the benefit of Article 43.47
In another case, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the receipt must
be provided “immediately,” as provided in Article 18.48 Although the loan
company in this case provided the written receipt after it received payment
by wire transfer, this was sometimes more than twenty days after the receipt
of payment. In a 2004 judgment, the Supreme Court concluded that the
receipt was not provided immediately and denied the loan company the
benefit of Article 43.49
In another 2004 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan held that, in
order to enjoy the benefit of Article 43, all of the items designated in Article
17 must be included in the loan documents. 50 In this case, all the
information was included except for a description of collateral. If there was
a missing item, the Supreme Court of Japan held, Article 17 was not
satisfied.51 The Supreme Court of Japan thus concluded that the consumer
loan company could not enjoy the benefit of Article 43.52
Furthermore, when the loan company preprinted all required
disclosures in Article 18 at the time the loan was made, and provided the
customer a series of bank transfer forms, together with each disclosure as
required by Article 43, the Supreme Court of Japan did not allow the loan
company to enjoy the benefit of Article 43. 53 Because the required
information must be provided in written receipt immediately after the receipt
of each payment, the Supreme Court of Japan held, anticipatory disclosures
provided before the payment did not satisfy the requirement of Article 43.54
The Supreme Court of Japan extended this philosophy of rigid
interpretation to cases involving revolving loan contracts–a practice that was
47
Id. The Consumer Loan Act, Article 18, paragraph 2, required the loan company to provide
written receipt only upon the request of the customer when the customer wired payment to the bank
account of the loan company. However, the Supreme Court of Japan construed Article 43 as overriding
Article 18, paragraph 2, to require written receipt even when the customer did not ask for it. The consumer
loan company was thus forced to provide the written receipt each time it received payment from the
customer. Id.
48
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
475 (2nd petty bench).
49
See also Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 9, 2004, 214 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 709 (2nd petty bench) (holding that written receipt delivered seven or ten days after
the payment was not immediately issued).
50
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
475 (2nd petty bench).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
380 (2nd petty bench).
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not anticipated at the time the Loan Company Act was enacted. When a
borrower made a revolving loan contract, the borrower could borrow money
up to the limit stipulated in the contract, and the borrower had a choice as to
the payment amount, term, and frequency. Therefore, it was impossible to
stipulate the amount of payment or the term and frequency of the payment in
advance in the loan contract. The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed the
necessity of strictly construing the Article 17 requirement.55 Although the
term and frequency of payment or the amount of payment could not be fixed
at the time of the contract, the loan companies were obliged to provide the
equivalent information, i.e., the minimum amount of payment and the term
and frequency of payment if the consumer decides to pay that minimum
amount in the loan document as stipulated in Article 17.56 The absence of
such equivalent information prevented loan companies from enjoying the
benefit of Article 43.
Furthermore, in its 2006 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan did
not allow even a minor exception to the disclosure requirement in the written
receipt. 57 In this case, the customer borrowed three million yen (30,000
USD), repayable over five years at a 29% interest rate, and when the
consumer fell behind in payment the loan company sued him to collect an
outstanding balance of some 1.9 million yen (19,000 USD). The customer
argued that payment of an interest rate higher than the interest rate stipulated
in the Interest Rate Limitation Act should be viewed as satisfying the
principal. The loan company countered that it could enjoy the benefit of
Article 43.
The loan company in this case provided necessary documents at the
time of the contract and also provided a written receipt every time it received
payment disclosing almost all information required. However, the company
indicated the customer’s contract number and not the contract date. Since
the contract number could be matched with the contract date, this might
seem to be a harmless error. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Japan held
that the loan company must strictly obey the exact requirements of Article
18 to enjoy the benefit of Article 43.58 This mistake was fatal for the loan
company, which could no longer enjoy the benefits of Article 43.
Indeed, this was not an error of the loan company. The loan company
simply relied upon the Cabinet Order, which permitted the loan company to
55

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 15, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
2899 (1st petty bench).
56
Id.
57
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 13, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1
(2nd petty bench).
58
Id.
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substitute the contract number for the contract date. In other words, the loan
company was merely following the government’s instruction. The Supreme
Court of Japan held, however, that the Loan Company Act simply delegated
the power to add, by the cabinet order, additional information to be
described in the receipt and was not meant to allow the substitution of listed
items with others. 59 Since the loan company must obey the exact
requirements of Article 18 to invoke Article 43, the Supreme Court of Japan
concluded that this order exceeded the bounds of legal discretion conferred
by the statute and is thus illegal.60 As a result, it held that the Cabinet Order
was invalid and that loan company could not rely upon this order to enjoy
the benefit of Article 43.61
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Japan also held that if there was
incorrect information or ambiguity in the loan contract then the loan
company could not satisfy the requirement of Article 17, thus precluding the
loan company from enjoying the benefit of Article 43.62 According to the
Supreme Court of Japan, all the designated items specified in Article 17 had
to be disclosed and that when they were not disclosed in an accurate and
clear manner the requirements of Article 17 were not satisfied.63 The loan
contract’s language in this case was incorrect with respect to the amount of
the loan and was unclear to the extent that the contract described days when
the lender would not make collection calls as “customary holidays when
transactions are not made.” The Supreme Court of Japan held that these
errors and ambiguity left the requirements of Article 17 unsatisfied and thus
prevented the loan company from enjoying the benefit of Article 43.64
B.

All Additional Payment Must Be Viewed as Payment of Interest

Second, the Supreme Court of Japan held that all the money the
customer paid, other than for the payment for the principal, should be
viewed as payment towards interest.65
59

Id.
Id.
Id. See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 17, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 927 (2nd petty bench).
62
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 24, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ
MINJI ] 243 (3rd petty bench).
63
Id.
64
Id. See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 24, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 319 (3rd petty bench) (collection day and payment day were unclear); Saikō Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] July 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO M INJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1980 (2nd petty bench) (amount
of the payment to be made was incorrect).
65
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 18, 2003, 57 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
895 (2nd petty bench).
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After the amendment to the Capital Subscription Act that reduced the
maximum interest rate from 40% to 29.2%, many consumer loan companies
came to substitute the higher interest rate with other charges, such as
collection or guarantee fees, and claimed that the interest rate did not exceed
the maximum rate. In one case, a consumer claimed a refund after paying
because the interest plus the fees exceeded the limit prescribed in the Interest
Rate Limitation Act. The Supreme Court of Japan upheld the argument of
the customer and concluded that any payment other than payment to be
applied to satisfy the principal should be viewed as payment of interest,
regardless of whether these payments were charged as fees or other
charges. 66 As a result, consumer loan companies are precluded from
charging other fees to avoid the limitation on interest rate.67
C.
Denying the Applicability of Article 43 When Loan Companies
Subtracted the Higher Interest at the Time of the Loan
Some loan companies subtract the higher interest rate at the time of
taking out the loan. In Article 2, the Interest Rate Limitation Act stipulated
that, when the interest was subtracted at the time of taking out the loan, all
the money beyond the amount recalculated according to Article 1, based on
the amount the borrower actually received as a principal, should be deemed
to be applied to the principal.68 The question was raised whether a consumer
loan company that subtracted a higher amount of interest at the time of
taking out the loan could still invoke Article 43 to receive a payment of a
higher interest rate. In a 2004 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan denied
the applicability of Article 43 when the loan company subtracted the interest
at the time of taking out the loan.69 Article 43 of the Loan Company Act is,
according to the Supreme Court of Japan, a special provision to Article 1,
paragraph 1 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act. 70 It is not a special
provision to Article 2 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act. Therefore, Article
43 of the Loan Company Act is not applicable when Article 2 of the Interest
Rate Limitation Act is applied.71
66

See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 617 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 16, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 729 (3rd petty bench).
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See also Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983, art. 12-8, para. 2.
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Risokuseigenhō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 2.
69
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
475 (2nd petty bench).
70
Id.
71
Id.

572

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

D.

VOL. 22 NO. 3

Construing the Requirement of Voluntariness Rigidly

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Japan came to construe the word
“voluntarily” strictly to deny the application of Article 43. The warning sign
was given by the concurring opinion of Justice Shigeo Takii in a 2004
judgment.72 This case involved a loan contract with a clause that mandated
the borrower pay back all of the remaining loan when he or she defaulted on
one payment and a clause that mandated a much higher interest rate (40%,
higher than the permissible maximum rate) when he or she defaulted.
Because a consumer could not borrow money unless he or she agreed to this
acceleration clause, Justice Takii argued, any payment made under this
acceleration clause should not be viewed as being made “voluntarily.”
Justice Takii’s opinion did not attract support of the majority in 2004,
but the majority adopted Justice Takii’s stance in their January 13, 2006
judgment. 73 In this case, an acceleration clause in the loan contract
stipulated that, in the event of default, all of the remaining balance and
interest was due immediately, with the penalty of a higher, 29.2% interest
rate. According to the Supreme Court of Japan, Article 43 is an exception
and must be interpreted strictly in light of the legislative intent to protect the
interests of borrowers.74 In order to decide whether the borrower had paid
the interest “voluntarily,” the Supreme Court of Japan held that courts must
examine whether there was coercion in fact. 75 When there was an
acceleration clause, the Supreme Court of Japan reasoned, the borrower had
to pay the excessive interest in order to avoid the penalty, and therefore any
payment under this acceleration clause could not be said to be a payment of
the borrower’s own free will in the absence of special circumstances.76
Since this acceleration clause was included in almost all consumer
loan contracts, this judgment practically excluded all benefit of Article 43
from all consumer loan companies.77 This holding was a landmark in the
history of pro-consumer jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Japan.
72

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
475 (2nd petty bench) (Takii, J. concurring).
73
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 13, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1
(2nd petty bench).
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The day this judgment was handed down was indeed a “doomsday” for the consumer finance
business in Japan. See James Johnson, An Activist Supreme Court Does Not a Market Make: The Effect of
Japanese Supreme Court Rulings on the Consumer Finance Industry, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 16, 27 (2008).
The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed this rigid attitude in the later judgments as well. See Saikō
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The Supreme Court of Japan confirmed this demanding attitude
toward voluntariness in its other 2006 judgment. In this case, the Supreme
Court of Japan required clear evidence that the excessive interest was paid
voluntarily.78 In order to do this, the Supreme Court of Japan held that it
was insufficient that the loan company did not violate laws that regulate
collection methods with administrative or criminal penalties.79 The courts
must examine the totality of circumstances to ensure that the borrower paid
the excessive interest of his or her own free will. 80 This holding placed the
burden of proof on the loan company to prove that the borrower paid the
excessive interest out of his or her own free will, and it was not sufficient to
prove that the loan company obeyed all laws. This burden of proof is
onerous for the loan company to carry. This will practically preclude all
consumer loan companies from the benefit of Article 43, because it is
practically impossible for the loan companies to prove by clear evidence that
the borrowers “voluntarily” paid back higher interest.
E.

Viewing Overpayment as Satisfying Other Loans

According to the Supreme Court of Japan, when the customer makes a
payment towards excessive interest, that payment will be automatically
applied to satisfy the principal. All the payments made after the principal is
wiped out are overpayments. As we will see below, however, the Supreme
Court of Japan came to view the overpayment as satisfying the principal of
remaining loans and the principal of new loans taken out after the payment.
Many consumer loan companies conclude basic contracts with
customers. Borrowers are able to borrow a series of loans under this basic
contract up to the limit so long as that basic contract remains valid.
Sometimes, when payments wipe out the principal of the original loan, the
customer may have another loan under the same basic contract. Then it
would be beneficial for the customer to argue that overpayment should be
viewed as satisfying the other remaining loans based on the same basic
contract. Sometimes, when the consumer pays back the original principal,
there is no remaining loan but he or she might borrow money after the
payment under the same basic contract. Then, it would be beneficial for the
petty bench); Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 24, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 243 (3rd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 17, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 927 (2nd petty bench).
78
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 19, 2006, 219 S AIKŌ S AIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 31 (1st petty bench).
79
Id.
80
Id.
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customer to claim that the overpayment should be applied to satisfy the
principal of the new loan made after the payment. Sometimes, the consumer
loan company repeatedly lends money without a basic contract to the
consumer, and the consumer might have other loans when their payments
satisfy the original loan or may take out a new loan after paying back the
first loan. The consumer might want the loan company to apply the
overpayments towards the satisfaction of the new or remaining loans.
When there is a basic contract to allow borrowers to repeatedly
borrow and pay back money, the Supreme Court of Japan held in 2003 that
borrowers generally prefer the reduction of the total amount of loan and do
not prefer the existence of multiple loans.81 When the payment of excessive
interest satisfies the principal and when there is an overpayment, the court
concluded that payment must be presumed as satisfying the remaining
outstanding loans based on the same basic contract, unless there is a special
circumstance to indicate otherwise. 82 In other words, this holding
established a very strong presumption that the borrowers’ intent was to apply
the overpayment to the remaining loan in the absence of a contrary
agreement in the contract.83
What would happen if there was no other outstanding loan when the
overpayment was made? There would be no other loan to be satisfied by the
overpayment. However, the Supreme Court of Japan held in 2007 that the
basic contract should be interpreted to allow the overpayment to be applied
to the satisfaction of the other loan even if that loan is made after the
overpayment.84 This holding affirmed that the overpayment to the first loan
under the basic loan contract should be viewed as satisfying the principal of
the other remaining loans in the absence of contrary agreement.85 If there is
no remaining loan, the overpayment to the first loan would not be
automatically applied to the new loan made after the payment.86 But if there
is an agreement to apply that overpayment to the new loan, then the
overpayment must be viewed as satisfying the new loan.87 In this case, the
basic contract allowed the borrower to borrow money up to the prescribed
81
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 18, 2003, 57 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
895 (2nd petty bench).
82
Id.
83
Id. See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ
MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI ] 617 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 16, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 729 (3rd petty bench).
84
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO M INJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1537 (1st petty bench).
85
Id.
86
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limit and allowed the borrower to pay back monthly to the bank account of
the loan company based upon the total balance of all remaining borrowings
and interest rate calculated based on the balance. The Supreme Court of
Japan accepted this finding of the lower court and found that the
overpayment was supposed to be applied to all remaining balances in total,
and there was an agreement to apply the overpayment to the new loan after
the payment was made.88
When there is no basic contract, however, the consumers have some
difficulty, but there is hope. In a 2007 judgment, the Supreme Court of
Japan held that in the absence of a basic contract each loan contract should
be viewed as a separate contract precluding the satisfaction of the second
loan by the overpayment to the first loan, absent special circumstances.89 An
exception can be made, however, when borrowings are repeated between the
borrower and the loan company as if there was a basic contract, and either
the second loan was already assumed at the time of the first loan or there
was an agreement to view the overpayment to the first loan as satisfying the
second loan. This judgment did not allow the borrower to apply the
overpayment of the first loan to a different loan in the absence of basic
contract. But if the borrower could prove that the second loan was a part of
a single continuous loan or prove the existence of contrary agreement, then
the borrower could apply the overpayment to the second loan.
Indeed, in another 2007 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan
viewed the ongoing contractual relationship between the loan company and
the customer as a continuous transaction when the second loan was made
three months after the payment to the first loan, even in the absence of the
basic contract.90 In this case, the loan company changed and added another
loan every time the borrower increased its loan, and the second loan was
made shortly after the first loan based on the same terms and conditions.
The Supreme Court of Japan agreed that this was a part of a single
consecutive transaction and the parties anticipated the subsequent loan at the
time of the first loan and generally did not want the existence of multiple
loans.91 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Japan concluded that there was an
agreement to apply the overpayment of the first loan to satisfying the loan
made after the payment.92 This holding made it possible for consumers to
88
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Saikō Saibansho[ Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
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argue that, even in the absence of a basic contract, an overpayment of the
first loan should be applied to the second loan even if the second loan was
made after the overpayment to the first loan.
What would happen if the basic contract expired and there was
another basic contract and a new loan after the payment? Could the
consumer argue that the overpayment to the first loan should be applied to
the new loan made under the new basic contract? The Supreme Court of
Japan held that in such a case, the overpayment to the first loan should not
be applied to the new loan made under the new second contract in the
absence of special circumstances such as the contrary agreement.93 Again,
the customers had to prove that there was a contrary agreement to apply the
overpayment of the first loan to the new, second loan, but at least this
holding left room for the borrower to prove special circumstances existed.
Moreover, when the borrower borrows and returns money repeatedly
under the basic contract and payment towards a higher interest rate on the
first loan is to applied to another loan under the basic contract, the principal
of the new loan is to be calculated by adding the remaining balance of the
principal of the first loan after applying the payment of higher interest to the
principal and the amount of new loan.94 The maximum interest rate should
be calculated based on the amount of that new loan and, if the amount of the
principal moves up to a higher amount, then the corresponding lower
maximum interest rate would be applied and any higher interest rate would
be void.95 When the amount of principal moves down to a lower amount
93
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 18, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 28
(2nd petty bench). The Supreme Court of Japan listed the length of the first basic contract, the duration
between the last payment under the first basic contract and a new loan under the second basic contract, the
return of the contract document of the first basic contract, the validity of the ATM card to be used, the
degree of contact between the loan company and the borrower after the last payment for the first basic
contract and the conclusion of the second basic contract, the history leading to the conclusion of the second
basic contract, and the difference in the terms and conditions of the loan between the first and second basic
contract as factors to be considered to decide whether the first basic contract and the second basic contract
should be viewed as a part of the single continuous transaction. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Japan
overturned the judgment of the lower court that held four basic contracts concluded between the loan
company and borrower were parts of a single continuous loan contract because of the inclusion of the
automatic extension clause in each contract and held that the court must also consider the length of period
between the last payment of the previous loan and new loan. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 14, 2011, 237
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 263 (1st petty bench). See also Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2012, (3rd petty bench) (borrower concluded another contract with the loan
company allowing mortgage on the property to pay off all remaining debts from the continuous loan under
the previous basic contract, but the Supreme Court of Japan concluded that there was no continuity
between the first basic contract and the second loan contract because of the differences in the nature of
contracts).
94
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921 (3rd petty bench).
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however, the same maximum interest rate rather than the higher maximum
interest rate must be applied.96
F.

Allowing Customers to Demand a Refund

As explained above, the 1968 judgment of the Supreme Court of
Japan held that customers could demand a refund for overpayment to
remedy unjust enrichment if the payment towards excessive interest was
applied to satisfy the principal and there remained no principal to be paid.97
This holding made it possible for many customers who had already paid off
all the loans with higher interest rates to claim a refund.
The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim is ten years.98
As discussed below, the Supreme Court of Japan handed down a judgment
in favor of the borrower as to the starting date of this statute of limitations.99
Nevertheless, many borrowers who had made overpayments more than ten
years earlier could not claim a refund because of the statute of limitations.
Some borrowers, relying on tort claims, insisted that their claim for a
damage award should still be permitted because the statute of limitations for
tort claims is twenty years. 100 They argued that the loan companies
committed a tort when they received payments towards the excessive
interest, knowing that those rates were violating the Interest Rate Limitation
Act. The Supreme Court of Japan was not persuaded.101
The loan companies were surely committing a tort when they
employed violent or intimidating methods of collection, or when their
behaviors were extremely improper in light of the social conscience, such as
when a lender dared to collect money knowing that there was no factual or
legal basis for their loans, or when the lender, as a regular loan company,
should have known that there was no factual or legal basis for their loans.102
But they did not commit a tort, the Supreme Court of Japan concluded,
simply by receiving a voluntary payment for interest higher than the rate
stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act. 103 This holding, while
rejecting tort liability of consumer loan companies in general, left room for
claims that a consumer loan company had committed a tort when it received
96
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MINPŌ [CIV.C.], art. 724. The plaintiff must also file a tort action within three years of learning
of the damage and offender. Id.
101
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1445 (2nd petty bench).
102
Id.
103
Id.
97

578

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 22 NO. 3

payments toward excessive interest rates and the requirements of Article 43
of the Loan Company Act were not satisfied.
What would happen if the loan company sold its business to another
loan company and there was an explicit clause denying the transfer of any
legal obligation arising from the loan business to the new loan company?
Could the customer still claim that their payment of excessive interest to the
previous loan company should be applied to the new loan concluded with
the new loan company, or claim a refund for overpayment from the new
company? The Supreme Court of Japan held that the scope of the transfer
should be based upon the intent of the parties and, if there was such a clause
in the contract, then the new loan company had no legal obligation to adopt
the obligation of the previous loan company to refund overpayments. 104
However, this holding left room for the consumer to argue that, in some
cases, the intent of the parties was to transfer to the new loan company the
obligation to make a refund.105
G.

Imposing the Obligation to Pay a Refund with Statutory Interest Rate

Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the consumer loan
companies must return an overpayment at the statutory interest rate. As we
already saw, the consumer loan companies must return an overpayment to
remedy unjust enrichment under Article 703 of the Civil Code.106 If the loan
company is a bad-faith recipient (i.e. if they knew that they were receiving a
payment without a legal reason), the company had to return the money at the
statutory interest rate under article 704.107 Consumer loan companies argued
that they were not bad-faith recipients because they believed in good-faith
that the payment was valid under Article 43 of the Loan Company Act,

104
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 22, 2011, 236 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 225 (3rd petty bench). See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 7, 2011, 237 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [S AIBANSHŪ MINJI] 139 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July
8, 2011, 237 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 159 (2nd petty bench); Saikō
Saibansho [Sup.Ct.], June, 29, 2012, 241 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 1
(2nd petty bench). It must be noted, however, the transfer could not be made unless the debtor gave
consent or the debtor was notified (if the debtor filed objection, the transfer could not be made). MINPŌ
[CIV. C], art. 466.
105
For instance, if the contract between the parent company and its subsidiary indicated the intention
of switching all the contract obligations between customers and its subsidiary with new contract between
the same customers and parent company, then the parent company owes a legal obligation to make a refund.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.], Sept. 30, 2011, 237 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI]
655 (2nd petty bench). See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 29, 2012, (2nd petty bench).
106
MINPŌ [CIV. C.], art 703.
107
Id. art. 704.
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while consumers argued that the loan companies must be viewed as badfaith recipients because they knew that the higher interest rate was illegal.
The Supreme Court of Japan held in a 2007 judgment 108 that a
consumer loan company that receives a payment towards an interest rate
higher than the maximum rate stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act
should be presumed to be a bad-faith recipient who is obliged to make a
refund at the statutory interest rate. Even though a loan company believed
that it could enjoy the benefit of Article 43, that loan company is still
presumed to be a bad-faith recipient, unless there are exceptionally
compelling reasons for that loan company to have believed that it could
enjoy the benefits of Article 43.109
As a result of this holding, a loan company that fails to provide a
written receipt as stipulated under Article 18 cannot claim not to be a badfaith recipient to avoid paying a refund with statutory interest. 110 The
Supreme Court of Japan also held that if the loan company could not enjoy
the benefit of Article 43, the loan company should have realized that the
payments towards interest had to be applied to the principal and, if no
principal was left, there was no legal reason to receive the payment and
therefore the company should be viewed as a bad-faith recipient. 111 All
consumer loan companies that received payment after payment toward the
higher interest rate wiped out the remaining principal are thus bad-faith
recipients who are obliged to make refunds at the statutory interest rate.
The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed this stance in 2011 with respect
to a loan company that lent money under a revolving loan contract. Until its
holding in 2005, the Supreme Court of Japan had never made it clear that,
with respect to such revolving loan contracts, the loan company at least had
to describe equivalent information–such as the minimum payment
requirements and the term and frequency of the payments–to satisfy the
requirement of Article 17 to enjoy the benefits of Article 43. The loan
108

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct] July 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO M INJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1980 (2nd petty bench).
109
Id.
110
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 2007, 225 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 103 (2nd petty bench).
111
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1980 (2nd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 2007, 225 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ
MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI ] 201 (3rd petty bench). However, before the 2006 judgment that precluded the
application of Article 43 when there was an acceleration clause mandating consumers to return all the
balance immediately when he or she defaulted, the consumer loan companies could not anticipate that
judgment and therefore could not be presumed to be a bad-faith recipient simply because of the inclusion of
such clause in the loan contract. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 10, 2009, 63 S AIKŌ SAIBANSHO M INJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1170 (2nd petty bench). See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 14, 2009, 231
SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 357 (3rd petty bench).
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company in this case argued that, since the loan company could not expect
this holding until that time, the loan company that failed to satisfy the
requirement should not be viewed as a bad-faith recipient. But the Supreme
Court of Japan disagreed.112 It noted that it was easy for the loan company
to expect that holding and that there was no clear legislative intent to allow
exceptions for revolving loan contracts.113 The Supreme Court of Japan thus
concluded that there was no exceptionally compelling circumstance to allow
the loan company to believe that it could enjoy the benefits of Article 43.114
As a result, consumer loan companies have to pay back refunds at the
5% statutory interest rate.115 Moreover, the consumer loan companies must
pay that statutory interest rate from the time the overpayment was
received.116
H.

Delaying the Starting Date for the Statute of Limitations

The Supreme Court of Japan held that the statute of limitations for a
refund claim starts from the end of the basic contract, not from the date of
overpayment. As we already saw, the statute of limitations for an unjust
enrichment claim is ten years,117 but there was a question as to when the
statute of limitations starts to run. Consumer loan companies argued that the
statute of limitations should start from the time of overpayment, because the
consumers could demand a refund from the time of overpayment. But the
Supreme Court of Japan disagreed. 118 So long as the basic contract
remained valid, it held, parties generally do not anticipate that the borrower
will demand a refund upon each overpayment; rather, the parties will assume
that the overpayment should be applied to the new loans made under the
112

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 2011, 238 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [S AIBANSHŪ
189 (1st petty bench).
113
Id.
114
Id. Applying this holding to a case before the court, the Supreme Court of Japan found the loan
company provided the equivalent information even before its 2007 holding but found that the borrower
already paid all the principal by paying excessive interest and therefore the loan company was still a badfaith recipient.
115
There was a dispute over whether the rate applicable to refunds should be a 5% statutory interest
rate, stipulated in the Civil Code (MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 404), or a 6% statutory interest rate, stipulated in
the Commercial Code (S HŌHŌ [COMM. C.] art. 514). However, the Supreme Court of Japan held that it
should be a regular 5% statutory interest rate that should be applied. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13,
2007, 61 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 182 (3rd petty bench).
116
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 2009, 2048 HANREI JIHŌ [H ANJI] 9 (2nd petty bench); Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2009, 231 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [S AIBANSHŪ MINJI] 477
(2nd petty bench).
117
MINPŌ [CIV.C.] art. 167.
118
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI H ANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
247 (1st petty bench).
MINJI ]

JUNE 2013

CONSUMER LOANS IN JAPAN

581

basic contract, and that the borrower will only claim a refund for
overpayment at the end of the series of continuous loans under the basic
contract. 119 It thus held that the statute of limitations should not start
running until the time when parties no longer anticipate any new loan under
the basic contract.120 The Supreme Court of Japan thus concluded that, in
the absence of special circumstances such as the existence of a contrary
agreement, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the end of the
series of transactions under the basic contract.121
As a result, even if more than ten years have passed since the time of
overpayment, consumers are allowed to demand refund if the demand is
made within ten years from the end of the basic contract. This holding made
it possible for an even greater number of customers to claim refunds.122
I.

Imposing the Duty to Disclose Transaction History to Customers

Finally, the Supreme Court of Japan mandated that consumer loan
companies disclose the history and details of a transaction to requesting
customers. In its judgment in 2005,123 the Supreme Court of Japan held that
loan companies had an obligation to provide the transaction record under the
good-faith requirement arising from the loan contract. Moreover, the loan
company has a duty of disclosure so long as the company maintains the
record, even if it is no longer mandated to keep it by statute.124 The failure
to disclose the transaction record is a tort that entitles a customer to recover
damages.125 As a result, the consumers could check the transaction record to
find out whether they made overpayment, whether there remained other
outstanding borrowing to be satisfied by the overpayment, and when the
overpayment started. This holding significantly facilitated consumers’
refund claims.
119

Id.
Id.
121
Id. See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 3, 2009, 230 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 167 (3rd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 6, 2009, 230 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO S AIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 209 (2nd petty bench).
122
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the statutory interest starts to accrue from the date
of overpayment even when there was an agreement to apply the overpayment to the satisfaction of new
loan under the basic contract. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2009, 231 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 477 (2nd petty bench). Since under the holding of the Supreme
Court of Japan a borrower is not supposed to claim refund under such an agreement until the end of the
continuous transaction under the basic contract, there seems to exist some inconsistencies in this holding.
123
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 19, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1783 (3rd petty bench).
124
Id.
125
Id.
120
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IMPACT OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN

What was the impact of these judgments of the Supreme Court of
Japan? In this Part, we will see that these judgments had a significant
impact on consumers and consumer loan companies and that they prompted
the legislature to introduce the 2006 amendments to consumer loan
regulation and bring in much tighter regulation of the industry. We will then
examine whether this development was a blessing for Japanese consumers
and consider whether this development successfully solved the root
problems of borrowing money in Japan.
A.

Impact of the Judgments

These holdings of the Supreme Court of Japan had a tremendous
impact on the consumer finance industry.126 It is true that not all judgments
of the Supreme Court of Japan are in favor of the borrowers. Indeed, some
dismissed the consumers’ claims against consumer loan companies.
Consumer advocates and lawyers criticized these judgments as not
sufficiently protective of borrowers. 127 But at least as a result of these
judgments, consumers were relieved of the obligation to pay higher interest
rates and could even demand a refund from consumer loan companies if they
paid unnecessary higher interest rates. Many lawyers and law firms took
this opportunity to make quick money and solicited consumers to consult
with them in order to file lawsuits against consumer loan companies.128 The
claims for refunds soared after these judgments.129
These judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan were strongly
supported by lawyers and the mass media.130 Almost all lawyers and the
126

These judgments “had a disastrous impact upon the financial condition of loan companies that had
previously relied on an expectation of enforceability of their premium rate loan contracts” under Article 43.
See Johnson, supra note 77, at 29.
127
YAGETA LAW FIRM, TOKUSHUNA KEISAN: KEIYAKUKIRIKAE, SAIKENJŌTO NO BAAI [SPECIAL
CASES: EXCHANGE OF DEBT AND TRANSFER OF CONTRACT], available at http://www.yagetalaw.jp/site_debt/ksn/ksn06.html (criticizing the Supreme Court of Japan for its failure to admit the transfer
of contract obligation to new companies).
128
Post kabarai bubblewa nandemoari: Kenzaikasuru bengoshikaino yuuutsuna genjitu [Everything
Is Acceptable in the Post Overpayment Bubble: Emerging Depressing Reality of Lawyers’ Society],
DIAMOND ONLINE, (Mar. 13, 2012), http://diamond.jp/articles/-/16546 (noting that the lawyers are
scrambling to find next lucrative job because the bubble of overpayment cases is almost over).
129
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 569.
130
Minashi bensaino tekiyounikansuru saikousaihanketsu nituiteno kaichouseimei [Statement of the
President on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan concerning the Receipt of Higher Interest as
Valid Payment] NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOUKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION],
Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/statement/year/2006/0602
03_2.html.
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mass media praised the bravery and wisdom of the Supreme Court of Japan
in denying the receipt of higher interest rates and allowing refund claims
from borrowers. They called for much tougher regulation on consumer loan
companies.131
Some estimate that roughly five million borrowers would be able to
seek refunds and it is estimated that the total amount of refunds to be paid by
all the consumer loan companies will reach up to ten trillion yen (100 billion
USD).132 Consequently, many consumer loan companies, overwhelmed by
this sudden rise of refund requests, went into serious financial trouble.
Many consumer loan companies registered red ink after these holdings.133
B.

The 2006 Amendments

The government responded to these holdings in 2006 by amending the
Interest Rate Limitation Act, the Capital Subscription Act, and Loan
Company Act.134 These amendments deleted Article 1, paragraph 2 of the
Interest Rate Limitation Act that had precluded a borrower from claiming a
refund if he or she voluntarily paid back the higher interest rate. 135 The
government removed the regulatory gap between the Interest Rate
Limitation Act and the Capital Subscription Act and made the maximum
interest rate of 20% the only maximum cap for loan companies. 136 The
131

TOKYO BENGOSHIKAI [TOKYO BAR ASSOCIATION], SHUSSIHŌ NO JOUGENKINRINO
HIKISAGETŌWOMOTOMERU IKENSHO [OPINION CALLING FOR REDUCTION OF MAXIMUM INTEREST RATE IN
THE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTION ACT] (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.toben.or.jp/message/ikensyo
/post-229.html.
132
Press Release, Shihoshoshi houjin Shinjuku jimusho [Judicial Scribner Corporation, Shinjuku
Branch], Yokohamachisai niyoru Takefuji motoshachoeno henkanhanketsuwo uke, sihoushoshi houjin
shinjukujimushoga kabaraikin, shakkin mondaino muryousoudanmadoguchiwo Yokohamani kaisetsu
[Judicial Scribner Corporation, Shinjuku Branch, Opened a Free Consultation Window on Overpayment
and Debt Issues Based upon the Judgment of the Yokohama District Court Against Former President of
Takefuji] (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.atpress.ne.jp/view/29142.
133
Johnson, supra note 77, at 30. Some foreign consumer credit companies pulled out from Japan or
significantly reduced their business in Japan. Id.
134
Kashikingyōno kiseitō nikansuru hōritsutō no ichibuwo kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act to Amend Parts of
the Act Concerning Regulation of Loan Company and Others], Law No. 115 of 2006. For a history leading
to these amendments, see Pardieck, supra note 14, at 569-76. For an outline of these amendments, see id.
at 576-80.
135
Risokuseigenhō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 1.
136
Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning
Regulation of Receipt of Subscription of Capital, Deposit and Interest Rate], art. 5, para. 2 (imposing a five
year imprisonment and/or a fine of no more than ten million yen [100,000 USD] as a punishment).
Everyone is prohibited from charging more than 109.5% interest rate by a five year imprisonment and/or a
fine of no more than ten million yen, id. para. 1, and, if the loan companies concluded a contract with
interest rate higher than 109.5%, then the punishment will be increased to ten years imprisonment and/or
fine of no more than 30 million yen [300,000 USD], id. para. 3. Depending upon the amount of the
principal, there is still a narrow gap between the maximum interest rate stipulated in the Interest Rate
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government prohibited loan companies from charging interest rates higher
than the rates stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act137 and deleted the
old Article 43.138 The government authorized the establishment of specified
credit information management organizations to share credit information
among registered loan companies.139 The government also imposed a new
obligation on loan companies to check the annual income of the customer140
(using credit information obtained through specified credit information
management organization), 141 prohibited loan companies from lending
money beyond the borrower’s capability to pay back, and mandated that the
total amount of a loan must not exceed one-third of the borrower’s annual
income.142
It was remarkable that the legislature decided to delete Article 1,
paragraph 2 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act and Article 43 of the Loan
Company Act despite its past reluctance to deny loan companies the benefit
of receiving voluntary payments of higher interest. The government, long
dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”), used to
be reluctant to deny consumer loan companies the benefit of receiving
payments for higher interest rates so long as their business activities
conformed to the government regulations. Now, faced with the strong call
for much tougher regulation from opposition parties such as the Democratic
Party of Japan (“DPJ”), 143 backed by wide mass media support, the LDP
government decided to delete these provisions.
These amendments took effect gradually. But they made it more
difficult for consumer loan companies to lend money and make a profit.144
Indeed, Takefuji, one of the largest consumer loan companies in Japan, had
to file a bankruptcy proceeding because of the enormous demands for
refunds and the slim possibility of making enough profit to pay all of the
Limitation Act and Capital Subscription Act. But since the loan companies are prohibited from charging
interest rate higher than the rate stipulated by the Interest Rate Limitation Act, any violation is null and
void and may be subject to administrative penalty.
137
Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983, art. 12-8, para. 1.
138
Id. art. 43 (replacing old article 43 with a different provision).
139
Id. arts. 41-13 to 41-38.
140
Id. art. 13, para. 1.
141
Id. art. 13, para. 2.
142
Id. art. 13-2. Also, the loan company was prohibited from receiving a life insurance payment from
suicide when it is a recipient of an insurance payment arising from the insurance policy (id. art. 12-7).
143
TOKYO METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN, SHUSSIHŌ OYOBI
KASHIKINGYOKISEIHŌ NOKAISEI NIKANSURU IKENSHO [OPINION ON AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL
SUBSCRIPTION ACT AND ACT CONCERNING REGULATION OF LOAN COMPANY] (Mar. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.togikai-minsyuto.jp/html/teireikaihokoku/th18/1801ikensyo.htm#1801ik04.
144
Finbarr Flynn & Takako Taniguchi, Moneylenders in Japan Brace for Losses, Shakeout on New
Rules, BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/japanconsumer-lenders-brace-for-losses-closures-as-new-rules-take-effect.html.
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refunds after the amendments went into effect. 145 Other major consumer
loan companies had to be rescued by major financial institutions and became
members of the major financial groups.146 The number of consumer loan
companies that were allowed under these new regulations was significantly
reduced.147 The judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan and the 2006
amendments triggered a tremendous shrinking of the consumer loan industry
and a massive reorganization.
C.

Blessing for Consumers?

These holdings are surely a blessing for many consumers who had to
pay back a higher interest rate. They no longer have to pay the higher
interest and they can even demand a refund at the statutory interest rate from
the consumer loan companies. Moreover, because of the 2006 amendments
introduced by the Diet in response to judgments of the Supreme Court of
Japan, many customers who are already deeply indebted will not be able to
borrow any more money and there will be smaller number of over-indebted
borrowers in Japan.148

145
Takefuji reported 433.6 billion yen [4.3 billion USD] in liabilities and would not be able to repay
all the overpaid interest from borrowers estimated to exceed one trillion yen [10 billion USD]. See Takako
Taniguchi & Takahiko Hyuga, Takefuji Files for Bankruptcy Protection after Refunds, BLOOMBERG, Sept.
28, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-27/takefuji-said-to-file-for-bankruptcytoday-amid-rising-interest-refunds.html. Technically, it was a corporate reorganization application, but
practically, it was an application for bankruptcy.
146
Promise is now controlled by the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc., led by the Mitsui
Sumitomo Banking Corp., and Acom is now a unit of Mitsubishi-UFJ Financial Group Inc., led by the
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. These megabanks decided to enter into the consumer retail loan
market by acquiring consumer loan companies. Aiful remains an independent consumer loan company, but
had to go through a reconstruction procedure with all lenders and seriously cut down its service in order to
avoid bankruptcy. Aiful, jigyosaisei ADR ga seiritsu [Aiful, Reconstruction ADR Accomplished], REUTERS,
Dec. 24, 2009, available at http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-13093520091224. On the
other hand, Lake was acquired by the Shinsei Financial and their business was transferred to the Shinsei
Bank, Ltd., which could enter the retail consumer loan market without the statutory restrictions designed
for consumer loan companies. Shinseiginko, shouhishakin-yujigyouwo ginkouhontaide tenkai [Shinsei
Bank, Offering Consumer Loan Service by the Bank Itself], REUTERS, July 20, 2011, available at
http://jp.reuters.com/article/domesticEquities4/idJPnTK046574520110720.
147
The number of registered loan companies significantly decreased to 2,677 in 2010, down from
47,504 in 1986. Atsushi Ohkawauchi, Kaiseikashikingyōhōno kanzensekō womeguru ronten [Issues
Concerning Full Implementation of the Amended Loan Company Act], 699 CHOUSA TO JOUHOU 1, 8-9
(2011). In 2011, the number decreased further to 2,350. NIHON KASHIKINGYŌ KYOUKAI [JAPAN FINANCIAL
SERVICES ASSOCIATION], HEISEI 23 NENDO NENJI HOUKOKUSHO [ANNUAL REPORT, 2011], available at
http://www.j-fsa.or.jp/doc/material/white_paper/h23/chapter3.pdf (hereinafter cited as Association Report).
148
It was estimated that the number of over-indebted borrowers who were borrowing money without
security from more than five loan companies decreased to 727,000 in 2009. Ohkawauchi, supra note 147,
at 5.
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Does this mean that the Supreme Court of Japan finally won a battle
against the Diet? Was the legislature now convinced that the Supreme Court
of Japan was right and that it was better to preclude consumer loan
companies from collecting higher interest rate? Or was the legislature
reluctantly forced to concede that a more stringent approach must be adopted
because of the devoted stance of the Supreme Court of Japan to protect weak
consumers? Or were the politicians of the ruling LDP, who used to be
supported by significant contributions from the loan companies, deciding to
revise the consumer loan regulation for the benefit of the consumers in an
attempt to win the popular support and the coming election? Or did the
Financial Services Agency, formerly content with Article 43, grab this
opportunity provided by the Supreme Court of Japan to accomplish their aim
of reorganizing the consumer loan industry into the financial institutions
they could more tightly regulate? Is this merely an attempt by the Financial
Services Agency to expand its power, possibly to elevate the agency into a
governmental department? Or is this an attempt by the Supreme Court of
Japan to provide lucrative jobs for money-strapped lawyers? Definitely, the
judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan were tremendously good news for
lawyers who are now forced to make less money because of the stiff
competition caused by the sudden increase of the number of lawyers after
the introduction of new law school system in 2004. Was the legislative
response merely a confirmation of this hidden motive of the Supreme Court
of Japan?
Whatever reasons may exist for the government and legislature to
accept those judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan, it is debatable
whether, in the long run, these judgments and the 2006 amendments had a
healthy impact on the consumer finance industry and consumers in general.
It was not the regular consumer loan companies that created the more
serious social issues. Rather, it was black market loan-sharks that illegally
charged extremely high interest rates and employed illegal and violent
collection methods, forcing consumers into a desperate situation and
creating more serious social problems. These companies were not legally
registered and usually did not have an established office. Gang members or
organized crime groups (yakuza) are often deeply involved in the operation
of such black market operations.149 For those consumers who already had
huge debt, they were the only organizations willing to lend money. Despite
the efforts of the Diet to introduce stringent regulation and the efforts of the

149

Pardieck, supra note 14, at 562; WEST, supra note 19, at 228-29.
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police to crack down on them,150 there were demands for them and it was
hard to wipe them out.
The registered, regular consumer loan companies were not, therefore,
serious troublemakers. However, by seriously restricting the regular
consumer loan industry and reorganizing its members into major financial
institutions, many consumers would probably face difficulty in finding a
company willing to lend them money. 151 The requirement to check the
annual income of the borrower before lending money would definitely
deprive many customers of the opportunity to borrow money. The potential
customers most affected might be housewives, who could no longer borrow
money based upon the income of their husbands. But many others,
including small business operators who, for instance, need immediate money
to pay salaries to their employees before receiving payment from clients or
customers, would not be able to secure the loan. 152 It is questionable
whether depriving customers of the opportunity to borrow money from these
regular consumer loan companies was really necessary.
There is also a question as to whether it was a wise policy to set the
maximum cap on interest rates at 20% per year and to deprive many
customers of the opportunity to borrow and pay back money even with a
higher interest rate. Indeed, even before the 2006 amendments, most of the
consumers who borrowed money with 29.2% maximum cap had no trouble
returning the money back. Now, as a result of the judgments of the Supreme
150
Of course, these loan sharks are violating the Capital Subscription Act and criminal penalties may
be imposed. The regulation against unregistered loan sharks intensified and the criminal penalty against
violation increased significantly in 2003. Kashikingyōno kiseitō nikansuru hōritsu oyobi shusshino ukeire,
azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari nikansuru hōritsu no ichibuwo kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act to Amend
Parts of the Act Concerning Regulation of Loan Company and Act Concerning Regulation of Receipt of
Subscription of Capital, Deposit and Interest Rate] (Unregistered Loan Sharks Eradication Act), Law No.
136 of 2003. Their use of illegal collection methods can be also charged as a criminal code violation.
Furthermore, loan contracts with extremely high interest rates may violate public order and good morality
and would thus be wholly null and void. See Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983,
art. 42, para. 1 (any loan contract with interest rate higher than 109.5% per year is void). Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Japan held that a loan contract with such an extremely high interest rate is so unethical
that the loan company could not seek a refund of the money it lent the consumer under a theory of unjust
enrichment. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 20, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 1488. When the customer sought damages against the loan company as a tort, the Supreme
Court of Japan also held, the loan company could not offset that money and damages and subtract that
money from the damages. Id.
151
The total amount of lending by loan companies decreased to 29.9357 trillion yen (299 billion
USD) in 2010, compared to 54.5309 trillion yen (545 billion USD) in 1999, indicating a 45% decline in
lending. Ohkawauchi, supra note 147, at 9. The ratio of conclusion of contract among the applicants at the
four major loan companies in 2010 was 29.1% compared to 61% in 2005, indicating that fewer applicants
are now approved for loans. Id. at 9-10.
152
It is estimated that among fourteen million customers as many as seven million customers would
be refused loans. Kaiseikashikingyōhōno hamon [Impact of Loan Company Act Amendment], REUTERS,
June 18, 2010, available at http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-15877020100618.
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Court of Japan and the 2006 amendments, consumer loan companies cannot
charge more than 20% and probably will not be willing to lend money unless
they can make a profit with 20% maximum cap. As a result, many
customers will simply be shut out from the consumer loan companies.153
Was this really necessary?
Moreover, capping the maximum, total amount of loans at one-third
the annual income of the consumer also raises a more controversial question
of whether such a limitation is necessary. It is hard to find a country in the
world having such an absolute total-amount limitation. Apparently, this
limitation is to protect the vulnerable consumers from borrowing money
beyond their capacity to pay back. But is there any special reason to believe
that Japanese consumers need this kind of special protection compared with
consumers in other countries? Moreover, even if such total amount
limitation is necessary, there still remains a question as to whether it is
actually appropriate to set the maximum cap at one-thirds of the annual
income.154
In addition to these questions, there is a more serious question: what
would happen if those consumers who desperately need money cannot
secure a loan from consumer loan companies? Indeed, there is a significant
possibility that some of the consumers who are refused a loan from regular
consumer loan companies might be forced to turn to the black market loansharks. 155 Simply limiting the maximum interest rate and imposing the
maximum cap on the total amount of loan does not help those consumers
who need money but who would not be able to secure a loan. Unless other
kinds of help are available, perhaps some consumers might end up relying
upon such illegal loan sharks. Otherwise, they might end up committing
suicide from desperation, not because of over-indebtedness but because of
the failure to secure a loan.
Thus, it is debatable whether the judgments of the Supreme Court of
Japan and the subsequent 2006 amendments are an actual blessing for
general consumers.
153

Masatoshi Kinoshita, Kashikingyōkiseihō kaisei wo meguru mondai [Issues regarding the
Amendment to the Act Concerning the Regulation of Loan Company], 7 HIROSHIMA HOUKADAIGAKUIN
RONSHŪ 1, 14 (2011).
154
Id. at 17.
155
Johnson, supra note 77, at 31. Although the Financial Services Agency denies it, there are already
some signs that indicate the sudden increase of customers who must turn to such illegal loan sharks.
Saishin detaga shimesu kin-ychōno shissei [Most Recent Data Shows the Mistake of the Financial Services
Agency], DIAMOND ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2011, available at http://diamond.jp/articles/print/14645; Loan-Shark
Lending Surge Feared in Japan, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-08-07/loan-shark-lending-surge-feared-in-japan.html.
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Roots of the Consumer Loan Issues

The roots of the problem might lie in the Japanese people’s attitude
toward borrowing money and in the legal system that is intended to save the
deeply-indebted borrowers.
Most people believe that when people borrow money they have to pay
it back. It is a contract and as far as borrowing money is concerned this
belief is widely shared, even when the interest rate is quite high. Borrowers
know when an interest rate is quite high and agree to pay the money back
together with that higher interest rate. How can borrowers then argue that
the interest rate was too high after borrowing the money? This strong belief
in the binding nature of the contract places tremendous pressure on the
borrowers to pay back the money they borrowed, even if the interest rate is
illegally high.156
Furthermore, borrowing money from a loan company is something
most people do not want revealed. It can be embarrassing, and therefore
people want to hide the fact that they are borrowing. Most customers of loan
companies do not want their neighbors, co-workers, and sometimes even
other family members know about their borrowing. This sense of
embarrassment has not changed even after consumer loans became
commonplace. The fact that the loan company workers come to the house or
workplace to collect the debt alone would be extremely embarrassing or
terrifying to the borrowers, something most borrowers would want
desperately to avoid.157 This would make it hard for borrowers to seek help.
If a debtor is over-indebted and cannot pay back a debt, that debtor
can definitely file a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding.158 Then, the judge
might relieve the debtor of the entire legal obligation to pay back the debt
and the borrower could start a new life. Of course, filing a bankruptcy
proceeding means that one’s future financial credit will be seriously
restricted. But if such a bankruptcy proceeding is quite easy, then the loan
company would not lend money beyond the capacity of the borrower to pay
back. The borrower will be granted a second chance. Nevertheless, in Japan
the bankruptcy proceedings takes time and a filing of bankruptcy often
means that the person is not capable of managing his or her own financial
156
It is often said that the Japanese attitude toward contract is more flexible. There are debates as to
whether this description is correct. See Michael Young, Masanobu Kato, & Akira Fujimoto, Japanese
Attitudes Towards Contracts: An Empirical Wrinkle in the Debate, GWU LAW SCHOOL, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=363400. It appears that the general public view
contract strictly binding when it comes to regular loan contract.
157
WEST, supra note 19, at 252 (noting that for Japanese people, publicly revealing the fact of debt is
itself shameful and to be avoided).
158
Hasanhō [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 75 of 2004.
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matters–it is embarrassing not only to the person who filed a bankruptcy, but
also to other family members or even relatives. 159 Filing bankruptcy is
therefore something that one wants to avoid at all costs.160
In other countries, a debtor can run away and there is a chance that
moneylenders will not find him or her. But in Japan, there is a family
registration system161 and a resident registration system,162 and every change
of address must be registered. Without the registration, it is extremely
difficult to live an ordinary life in Japan. These registrations used to be open
to the public for inspection. Despite the recent efforts to restrict access to
these registrations,163 there is a high risk that creditors may find the new
residence through this registration system.164 Running away is quite difficult.
Some of the loan companies require joint surety in order to borrow
money, although major loan companies do not. If the borrower cannot pay
back the loan or run away, the loan companies can go after the joint surety,
thus destroying the life of the person who became a joint surety.165 In most
cases, the join surety is a friend, relative, co-worker, or boss. The borrower
does not want to ruin the lives of these people who were kind enough to
become the joint surety. These are reasons why some over-indebted
borrowers ended up committing suicide in order to pay back their debts,
159

WEST, supra note 19, at 248-49 (noting that the feeling of guilt for burdening or offending the
parents or family by filing for bankruptcy because of huge debt may be one reason a debtor chooses suicide
over filing for bankruptcy).
160
Id. at 230-32. The number of voluntary bankruptcies gradually increased and reached 242,377
cases in 2002, the largest number yet.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/karisugi/index.html. The number of voluntary bankruptcy application
gradually declined thereafter. There were 100,509 voluntary bankruptcy applications in 2011. Trends in
the Number of Bankruptcy Filing by Self-aggregation Supreme Court, JAPAN FINANCE NEWS,
http://www.financenews.co.jp/b/main.html. After the Diet enacted the Civil Rehabilitation Act in 1999 and
made it available for individual debtors, an increasing number of debtors came to use this civil
rehabilitation proceeding rather than the bankruptcy proceeding. See Minjisaiseihō [Civil Rehabilitation
Act], Law No. 225 of 1999; See also WEST, supra note 19, at 256-62 (noting that the civil rehabilitation
procedure could be more effective and less stigmatic).
161
Kosekihō [National Registration Act], Law No. 224 of 1947.
162
Juhmintourokuhō [Resident Registration Act], Law No. 81 of 1967.
163
Id. art. 11-2, para. 1.
164
JUHMINHYŌ NO UTSUSHINO KOUHUSEIDOTŌNO ARIKATA NIKANSURU KENTŌKAI [STUDY GROUP ON
THE SYSTEM TO ALLOW REQUEST A COPY OF THE RESIDENT REGISTRATION], SOUMUSHO [MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATION], HOUKOKUSHO [FINAL REPORT] (Feb. 2007), available at
www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/jichi_gyousei/c-gyousei/pdf/jyuminhyo_utusi_16.pdf (noting that the
creditor has a legitimate reason to see the resident registration of the borrower in order to find the place of
residence).
165
NIHONBENGOSHIRENGOUKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION], HOSHŌSEIDONO
KONPONTEKIKAISEIWO MOTOMERU IKENSHO [OPINION CALLING FOR A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE TO THE
SURETY SYSTEM], available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/2012/120120.
html (notes that the surety system is one of the main reasons individuals are incurring huge debt and
committing suicide, and calls for a ban on individual to become surety).
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hoping that the life insurance payments would be sufficient to cover all the
debts.166
Consumer advocates, lawyers, and mass media blamed consumer loan
companies for all of the tragic suicides. Because the consumer loan
companies are willing to lend money and charge high interest rates, many
borrowers ended up borrowing money beyond their capacity to repay and
were forced to commit suicide.167 There is a need, some argued, to lower the
maximum interest rate, limit the total amount of the loan, and force
consumer loan companies to follow these regulations.168
This is exactly what was accomplished by the Supreme Court of Japan
and by the Diet. Surely, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan force
the consumer loan companies to obey the maximum interest rate. Surely
lowering the maximum interest rate by the 2006 amendment will reduce the
burden of borrowers and imposing the total amount limitation will reduce
the number of over-indebted borrowers. It is noteworthy that the Supreme
Court of Japan practically triggered all these changes by taking a leading
role. But it is unclear whether these changes are sufficient to solve the root
problem of money borrowing in Japan.169
166

In 2010, 31,690 people committed suicide and 7,438 people were believed to have committed
suicide for economic and personal reason. See KEISATSUCHŌ [NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY], HEISEI 22
NENCHŪ NIOKERU JISATSUNO GAIYŌ SHIRYŌ [DATA CONCERNING THE SUICIDE IN 2010],
http://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki/H22jisatsunogaiyou.pdf. Many tend to believe that the difficulty
and stigma of bankruptcy proceeding is the main reason for debtors to choose suicide. But see WEST,
supra note 19, at 236-54 (questioning the correlation between bankruptcy and suicide). The Japanese
Commercial Code (SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.], art. 680) provides that the insurers need not pay insurance in
suicide cases but Japanese life insurance contract normally excludes insurance payment for suicide only for
one year after the contract. Therefore, those debtors who committed suicide after one year can expect that
the insurance companies will pay the life insurance so that the surviving family does not have to worry
about the debts. Id. at 260-61. In some cases, the loan companies carried the life insurance on the
borrower and received the payment directly from the insurance company, even without telling the
borrowers or their families. The Diet thus prohibited the loan company from receiving the insurance
payment from suicide if it carried the life insurance on the borrower. See supra note 142.
167
NIHONBENGOSHIRENGOUKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION], SHUSSIHŌNO
JOUGENKIRINO HIKISAGETŌWO MOTOMERU IKENSHO [OPINION CALLING FOR REDUCTION OF THE MAXIMUM
INTEREST RATE IN THE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTION ACT] (July 18, 2003), available at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/2003_32.pdf.
168
Id.
169
After the amendments fully took effect the government, led by the DPJ since 2009, established a
project team to report on the full implementation of the amendments. The report made ten proposals in
response to the criticisms, including a proposal to facilitate financial institutions to enter into consumer
retail loan business, to provide safety net for consumers who need money, to provide loan for small
business operators, and to call for much tougher enforcement of law against illegal loan sharks. FINANCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY, KASHIKINGYŌSEIDO NIKANSURU PUROJEKUTOCHIMU HOUKOKU [REPORT OF THE
PROJECT TEAM ON LOAN COMPANIES] (Apr. 2, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/kashikin/pt.
pdf. On the other hand, the LDP, an opposition after 2009, proposed amendments to the amended Loan
Company Act to change maximum interest rate to fluctuate with the prevailing interest rate with the
maximum cap of 30% per year and eliminate the limit on lending beyond one-thirds of the annual income.
Jiminshouiga kashikingyohonado kaiseian [LDP Subcommittee Proposed Amendments to the Loan
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THE PASSIVE COURT AND LIMITS OF JUDICIAL CREATIVITY

A.

Interpretive Method Used by the Supreme Court of Japan
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In addition to their huge impact, the judgments of the Supreme Court
of Japan in the consumer loan cases are also extremely noteworthy for their
judicial creativity. They created a highly pro-consumer jurisprudence by
ignoring the contrary legislative intent and rewriting the statute. This
creativity is all the more striking because the Supreme Court of Japan
generally takes a very passive and conservative attitude toward
constitutional adjudication.
It is true that there was an inconsistency or gap between the Interest
Rate Limitation Act and the Capital Subscription Act. It could be argued
that this inconsistency or gap was a result of the legislative compromise.
While limiting the interest rate one can use, the legislature might have
believed that the consumer loan companies should be entitled to receive the
voluntary payment of higher interest unless the interest rate exceeded the
limit criminally prohibited. Apparently, however, the Supreme Court of
Japan did not accept this compromise and employed a skewed interpretation,
practically nullifying this compromise.
The Supreme Court of Japan must have faced a difficult dilemma
when the legislature enacted the Loan Company Act and reintroduced the
compromise. In exchange for the introduction of government regulation, the
legislature decided to allow the consumer loan companies to receive the
interest rate higher than the maximum interest rate stipulated in the Interest
Rate Limitation Act as a valid payment subject to the limitation set by the
Capital Subscription Act. Apparently, the legislative intent was to overrule
the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan. But once again, the Supreme
Court of Japan practically overturned this legislative judgment and wiped
out the compromise provision in favor of the consumers.170
The interpretive techniques used are sometimes highly textual: the
Supreme Court of Japan demanded that the requirements of Article 43 be
strictly observed before the consumer loan company could enjoy the benefits
of Article 43. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan construed the
Company Act], REUTERS, May 23, 2012, available at http://jp.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idJPTYE8
4M05Y20120523. It appears that the LDP now regrets its 2006 amendment to the Loan Company Act.
Since the LDP recaptured the government in December 2012, it will be interesting to see whether the new
LDP government is willing to revise the Loan Company Act again.
170
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 531 (these judgments “turned statutory law into dead law”); Kinoshita,
supra note 153, at 8.
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requirements of Article 17 and Article 18 utterly literally. Sometimes,
however, purposive interpretation achieves the goal of protecting
consumers–the Supreme Court of Japan applied the thrust of Article 43 to
revolving loan contracts, requiring the description of the equivalent
information in the contract document, as required by Article 17. The court
also apparently wished to protect consumers when it denied the consumer
loan company the benefit of Article 43 when there was an acceleration
clause in a contract. The Supreme Court of Japan did not care much about
the compromise the legislature made in designing the consumer protection
measures.
The Supreme Court of Japan sometimes presumed the intent of the
parties was to afford protection to borrowers. When there was a basic
contract to allow repeated borrowing, the Supreme Court of Japan presumed
that the parties intended to apply the overpayment for the first loan to the
principal of the remaining second loan. Even when there was no outstanding
loan at the time of the payment, still the Supreme Court of Japan assumed
that there was an agreement to apply the overpayment to the principal of the
future new loan. Sometimes, the Supreme Court of Japan allowed borrowers
to prove special circumstances or contrary agreements while denying the
remedy they requested in principle–borrowers could prove that the
overpayment for the first loan should be applied to the second loan, even in
the absence of the basic agreement. But other times it completely ignored
the intent of the parties, as when the payment of an excessive higher interest
rate was applied to the principal of the loan even when the borrower
specified the payment was the payment of interest.
It is remarkable that, in those judgments, the Supreme Court of Japan
relied heavily upon the overarching purpose of protecting the interests of
borrowers of the Loan Company Act rather than invoking the general
clauses of the Civil Code. Apparently, it felt that these general clauses are
not appropriate, that they ignored the legislative provision. Instead, the
Supreme Court of Japan believed that Article 43 is an exception in light of
that overarching legislative goal and should be narrowly construed, to be
eliminated if possible. This understanding led the Supreme Court of Japan
to practically wipe out Article 43.
These judgments clearly show that the Supreme Court of Japan could,
and indeed in some cases does, act quite creatively. Moreover, the
judgments are highly liberal in the sense that they are meant to protect
vulnerable consumers against powerful consumer loan companies. Despite
its general passive and conservative stance toward constitutional
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adjudication, these judgments show that the Supreme Court of Japan could
adopt a very creative and highly liberal stance in non-constitutional cases.
B.
What Has Made the Supreme Court of Japan Engage in Such Judicial
Creativity?
Why could the Supreme Court of Japan believe that it should actively
create such a pro-consumer jurisprudence, even by ignoring or disregarding
the legislative intent? Surely, Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan knew
horror stories of many consumers who were forced to run away, sell their
organs to pay off their debt, or commit suicide. They must have been
convinced that they must do something. Moreover, unlike lower court
judges, who are appointed right after the professional training and remain on
the bench until their retirement, not all of the Justices of the Supreme Court
of Japan are career bureaucrats working inside the judiciary. Although by
custom, six out of fifteen Justices would be appointed from lower court
judges and two would be appointed from prosecutors, four would be
appointed from practicing attorneys, two would be appointed from
government bureaucrats and one from academia.171 Therefore, the Supreme
Court of Japan could act more flexibly. Indeed, Justice Takii, who took a
lead in the development of the pro-consumer jurisprudence, was a former
attorney. But apparently, these judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan
are also supported by Justices appointed from lower court judges and
prosecutors. Moreover, in the consumer loan cases, it is the lower court
judges that played a leading role in shaping the pro-consumer jurisprudence
that ultimately led the Supreme Court of Japan to create its own proconsumer jurisprudence.172 Lower court judges are generally more creative
and more supportive to borrowers than the Supreme Court of Japan as a
whole.
From the standpoint of financial stability, the increase of unsecured
consumer loans and the existence of a huge number of deeply indebted
consumers is surely a headache. But from the standpoint of consumer
protection, the existence of illegal loan sharks and the use of violent and
intimidating collection methods are more serious problems. Instead of
imposing much tougher criminal penalties or strengthening the regulation of
or enforcement against these illegal loan sharks, however, the Supreme
Court of Japan chose to deny the benefit of receiving higher interest rates
from regular consumer loan companies and forced the Financial Services
171
172

MATSUI, supra note 4, at 123-24.
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 554-56.
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Agency and the Japanese Diet to adjust the maximum interest rate and limit
lending beyond the capacity of the borrower to repay. Why did the Supreme
Court of Japan decide to take this course?
Maybe the Supreme Court of Japan believed that it was unethical for
consumer loan companies to take advantage of the loophole in the law to
receive the higher interest. It might have believed that the courts must do
something to relieve the financial burden of those borrowers who had to pay
higher interest rates. Or it might have believed that the Supreme Court of
Japan, as an ultimate guardian of justice and morality, must achieve justice
even by ignoring the legislative compromise.
The judiciary does more than simply fill in legislative lacunae,
Professor Andrew Pardieck remarked, and in the consumer loan cases we
can find an example of judicial nullification.173 “The judiciary has rejected
attempts by the bureaucracy and Diet to legislatively revise judicially
established norms. It has cast itself as an arbiter of societal norms and,
through a technical application of the law, imposed substantive as opposed
to procedural justice.” 174 Pardieck thus argues that the concept of
substantive justice remains firmly embedded in Japan175 and that the courts
viewed law “as a protective, regulative, paternalistic and now, above all, a
paramount expression of the moral sense of the community.”176 In this sense,
the Supreme Court of Japan might have attempted to achieve what it
believes to be substantive justice by creating a judicial doctrine that is
contrary to the legislative intent.
Moreover, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan taught a
lesson to average Japanese consumers regarding the necessity and
desirability of seeking legal advice from lawyers and encouraged them to
file litigation, thus providing for the first time in history of Japan actual
incentive to file a suit for many citizens. As a result, claims for refunds and
suits seeking refund as remedy for unjust enrichment soared. In this sense,
the Supreme Court of Japan might have attempted to show justice to the
public as well.
The Supreme Court of Japan might have believed that it must curb the
stronger power of the consumer loan companies to protect the vulnerable
borrowers, reflecting a value judgment in favor of the community. While
adhering faithfully to the doctrinal constructs and language of the civil law
tradition, Professor Haley pointed out:
173
174
175
176

Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 586.
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Japanese judges have fashioned the rules and adopted the
doctrines in distinctive ways. Instead of expanding the rights of
wives, tenants, and workers for their protection, the courts have
rather restrained the rights of fathers and husbands, landlords,
and employers to prevent their exercise in ways that seem
abusive or overreaching . . . . In case after case throughout the
century, Japanese judges have denied “rights” in order to
ameliorate what they have perceived to be the injustice of
property and contract enabling those with greater economic and
social leverage to enlist the aid of the state against those with
whom they dealt. Rather than developing new rights for the
weak, Japanese courts constrained the old rights of the
strong.177
Moreover, Professor Haley argues that these rules and doctrines are meant to
reinforce the community and have a strong “communitarian orientation.”178
He goes on to point out:
Japanese scholars have introduced new theory and doctrines
that in case after case enabled Japanese judges to shape the
rules and principles of the codes to conform community.
Japanese judges have discovered in their own community ways
to ensure consistency in the law and, though self-policing, to
maintain public trust and independence.179
All these judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan may be explained as
another example of restricting the stronger power to protect the weaker party,
and they are also an attempt to enforce community values.
But in these cases, the Supreme Court of Japan practically reversed
the judgment of the legislature and wiped out the compromise provision.
However unpopular that provision might be, the question must be asked:
was it appropriate for the courts to achieve justice, or even to reflect
community values, by ignoring the legislative compromise?180
177

JOHN O WEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 204-05 (1998).
Id. at 205, 211.
Id. at 205.
180
Professor Haley argues that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan shared the orientation of
the community even in the constitutional adjudication:
[I]n my view, judges in Japan share the prevailing communitarian orientation of their
society . . . . They also, I believe, accept the unstated premise that legislative and administrative
decisions reflect a consensus among participants—not a simple majority . . . . As a consequence,
judges are cautiously conservative. They adhere to precedent and endeavor to maintain, as best
they can in a changing society, legal order that is predictable and consistent. Stability is a virtue,
not a vice. They do not seek to be the catalysts of social change. They believe in democratic
178
179
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Of course, these judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan can be
characterized as judicial attempts to engage in a dialogue with the legislature.
The Supreme Court of Japan may simply be throwing the ball back to the
legislature to solve the social injustice. If the legislature was not happy with
the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan, it could overturn them and
enact new statutes. In this case, however, the legislature was ultimately
convinced that the Supreme Court of Japan was right and revised the statutes.
It might be argued, therefore, that there is nothing wrong with the judicial
attempt to overrule the legislative judgment and call for further
reconsideration. The important question to ask in this characterization is: to
what extent should one allow the Supreme Court of Japan to overturn a
legislative judgment. In the consumer loan cases, the Supreme Court of
Japan once stripped any meaning from Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Interest
Rate Limitation Act and the legislature overturned the judgment and inserted
Article 43 of the Loan Company Act. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of
Japan once again overturned the legislative judgment. The Supreme Court
of Japan may be suggesting that it will not back off. This is hardly an
attempt at dialogue.
It still remains to be seen whether the attempt of the Supreme Court of
Japan was a success. But it is surely quite controversial whether the
Supreme Court of Japan was justified in attempting to accomplish justice or
to reflect community values even by ignoring the contrary legislative intent.
When there is a social injustice, we cannot blame judges if they believed that
they had to do something. The public also expects the judges to do justice.
But they must remember one thing: judges simply cannot correct all social
injustice. Moreover, this may not be the proper job for judges and they may
not be the best persons to do this.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judicial creativity is not the hallmark of civil law judges. But judges
could and indeed do act quite creatively in some cases. The judgments of
the Supreme Court of Japan in the consumer loan cases showed that the
Supreme Court of Japan is no exception. Despite its passive and
conservative attitude toward constitutional adjudication in general, the
institutions and thus defer to the democratic institutions of governance while maintaining, indeed
reinforcing in their priority of values, the rule of law.
Johan O. Haley, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures and Values, 88 WASH U. L.
REV. 1467, 1491 (2011). Apparently, however, those judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan ignoring
the contrary legislative intent are not as deferential to the democratic institutions.
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Supreme Court of Japan indicated in these cases its willingness to overturn
the legislative judgments and rewrite the statute. If you are accustomed to
cloudy weather almost every day, you will be delighted to see the occasional
sunshine. But it is at least debatable whether we could enjoy the sunshine
brought in the consumer loan cases, because it is still unclear that the
judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan were really a blessing for
consumers and it is debatable whether the Supreme Court of Japan was
justified in wiping out the statutory provision ignoring the contrary
legislative intent. It will also be interesting to see whether the Supreme
Court of Japan is willing to show this kind of judicial creativity in other
cases as well.

